An Imperial Guard commander and the 1813 Campaign (V) …

… One could remark by the details I have given that the march from Dresden to Leipzig was a continuity of changes of direction, counter marches, etc., which clearly demonstrates the lack of firmness of the plans and the uncertainty of the projects of the Leader. One day we marched on Pegau, the next on Leipzig, the following day towards Wittenberg, then in the direction of Bohemia. The soldiers tired themselves without advancing and without any results; anxiety replaced confidence. The army was half destroyed before it had even fought.

Such was our plight on the morning of 16 October. Everything seemed calm and there was no sign of a (upcoming) clash. We set off at 8 in the morning for Lieberwolkwitz. Near this village we saw the army assembled and ready for battle. A moment later we heard three cannon shots being fired at equal intervals; it was the signal of the enemy.

The battle began with artillery fire to approach a well-defended height of artillery, which appeared to be one of the most important positions in the line. It was soon taken at bayonet point. The enemy’s left was fiercely attacked by our skirmishers, who wreaked havoc there. At that moment the order was given to form the attack columns and to march straight at the enemy. Victory was not in doubt and the total destruction of the Allies seemed certain.

The Saxon Corps made a movement which was considered to be the commencement of the general attack. It marched to the enemy in battle order with great regularity and celerity, but we soon witnessed the Allied generals welcoming the Saxons and the artillery, which a few minutes before had been posted beside us, now firing at us.

This defection caused a considerable gap in our army. In order to fill it in with haste, we initially assigned the cavalry of the Guard and the 2nd Division of the Young Guard there which were placed near the 12-pounder batteries. Instead of attacking, it was necessary to limit itself to holding the positions acquired towards the beginning of the battle.

Towards the evening, the army corps commanded by Mr. the Count de Lauriston, which had fought all day and had suffered much, beat the retreat and was soon in full rout. The brigade which I commanded was sent to rally it and halt the enemy’s march. It advanced at full speed and soon forced the enemy to withdraw and abandon their position. While marching towards the enemy, I was shot in the elbow of my right arm. I was not dressed until well into the night; the bullet had lodged itself in the bone and it was very difficult to remove it.

The brigade took up position at the entrance to the village and bivouacked in a square at a pistol range from the enemy vedettes.

One cannot conceive the kind of self-deception with which the Emperor was struck. Nothing could unravel his mind; an extraordinary fate pursued him without the lessons of experience being able to preserve him from the most minor mistakes.

He had successively witnessed the Austrians, the Bavarians and the Württembergers abandoning his army, and he had taken no precautions to safeguard himself against the treachery of the Saxons. If he had left them at Dresden and Pirna instead of the two French corps which were there, he would have achieved a complete victory which would have changed the course of events. Wanting to keep everything, he lost everything. A formidable lesson for the conquerors who would be tempted to imitate him!

On the 17th, the brigade remained in the same position. The Prussians attacked Leipzig, but were repulsed. Retreat was inevitable, however no precautions to avoid losses were taken.

Behind Leipzig there was a two league long defile with thirty-two or thirty-three bridges. It was easy to presume that the crews would be hampered there and that neither the army nor the artillery could pass. The Prince of Wagram [Marshal Berthier] had proposed to build wooden bridges in order to facilitate the march of the carriages while preserving the road for the army. The Emperor rejected this very wise plan, because he did not want anyone to consider retreating.

At 11 o’clock I received the order to put wood on the fires and to abandon the camp. At this moment, fire broke out in a building where my horses and equipment were located and, in an instant, everything was consumed by the flames. I lost my horses, my belongings, my money and was still injured with having neither a penny nor a shirt.

The night was spent in crossing the town and we slept in a meadow near the road to Naumburg. There already was a considerable amount of confusion due to the carriages in the streets and on the road.

On the 18th, after a short repose, the division received the order to proceed to the front of the city. General of Division Barrois marched at the head, but the congestion was such that he was separated from us and that we were unable to advance or go back.

At that moment, the enemy appeared at the entrance to the city. I found myself in great embarrassment; all the more so as the bullets which rained down on us increased the disorder even further. I feared that by not following the divisional general, I would be blamed as having neglected my duty … I immediately made up my mind; I had the street evacuated and placed two guns on the bridge and the others outside in order to flank the enemy and prevent them from occupying our area of retreat. I had the two regiments of Tirailleurs placed in a closed column on the left of the river and drove the enemy out of Rosenthal by Colonel Dariule together with five hundred tirailleurs. In an instant, the enemy was driven from the isle, leaving many dead behind. The shells set fire to the hospital where there were four or five hundred wounded of all nations, who perished as a result.

I had the general and the Emperor informed of the situation in which I had found myself. His Majesty told me by one of his aides-de-camp to guard this position and not to leave it until I gave the order. We fought all day to prevent the enemy from entering the city.

The regiment lost 18 killed and 114 wounded, including 7 officers. The 93 tirailleurs sent to the hospital were lost without being able to tell whether they were wounded or taken prisoner.

The confusion was increasing; I anticipated the moment when it would no longer be possible to get across (the river). To avoid this inconvenience, I sent my lieutenant-colonel Guillemin along with an adjutant-major to build a bridge over the Elster at a place far from the road and out of sight. These two officers carried out this assignment with marvellous dexterity. The bridge was built in a few hours; I had a company placed there to guard it. This precaution proved to be our salvation the next day, otherwise we would all have been killed or captured.

On 19 October, we were still fighting …

Source : Vionnet de Maringoné, Mes Campagnes – Russie et Saxe (1812-1813), À la Librairie des Deux Empires, 2003.